Colonel Cassad has published a very thorough discussion of the possibly identities and motives of those who have murdered Alexei Mozgovoi.  Thanks for the fantastic work of my brother in arms Uncle Martin I can now post this entire analysis in English.  Please forgive me the poor formatting of the article, but I simply have no time to do a lengthy formatting job right now.

The original translation by Uncle Martin can be found here:

The Saker

Murder of Mozgovoy – by whom and for what? Parts One and Two

Over Yesterday I collected a number of facts on this murder here: (in Russian)
My personal view of Aleksey Mozgovoy was described here:

Now let’s look at the proposed versions.

The following versions are put up as of today.

1. Mozgovoy was killed by the AFU SRG (sabotage/reconnaissance group) or by the embedded SBU group, as a part of a successfully performed spec op.
2. Mozgovoy was eliminated by “our side”, due to his opposition to the official political line.
3. Mozgovoy was killed by the local criminal circles because he impeded criminal activity in Alchevsk.
4. Mozgovoy was eliminated by some third party with the goal of triggering an internal upheaval in the republic and a subsequent “dump” of the people’s republics by Moscow.

Lets consider these versions based on the known facts.


On May 23rd at 17:50 MSK at the exit from Mikhaylovka to the Lugansk–Alchevsk road, Alexey Mozgovoy’s motorcade was ambushed. After a triggered explosion (according to one version this was an anti-personnel mine, according to another version it was an IED), heavy fire was opened on the vehicles that were driving on the road at close range using assault rifles and LMGs. The liquidators knew for sure who and when will be driving in this place, so Mozgovoy’s motorcade was effectively driving into a trap that was prepared in advance, Mozgovoy and his companions had effectively no chance to survive. According to the preliminary data, 6 more people died together with Alexey Mozgovoy.
The murder site with the bodies of the dead is shown in the video below.

Caution, the video is 18+

As it is not hard to see, the vehicles were primarily hit by automatic fire, which is evidenced by numerous bullet holes (most likely, all of them of the 7.62 caliber). Exactly who was shooting remains unclear at this moment, so speaking of who benefits and who could order and execute this, we can’t say for sure but rather are forced to make conclusions based on circumstantial evidence and motives.
Now let’s go over the versions, starting from the least probable, which is associated with criminal circles.

Criminal Circles

On the one side, the local crime bosses indeed had serious motives to get rid of Aleksey Mozgovoy, who was a serious obstacle for conducting “business” in Alchevsk (he was receiving persistent threats due to this by not getting involved in large-scale schemes of expropriation and coal trading. That is why it is certain that in Alchevsk and the neighboring territories there were people who wanted Aleksey dead and were quite jubilant when he died. However, the nature of the attack and the precise data of vehicles location doesn’t suggest that the murder was carried out by some local bandit group. How an attack by bandits against the commander looks like could be seen in the recent story of an attempt on “Givi”s live, where, after disarming the Makeyevka’s commandant office and the arrest of “Murky”, “Givi”s car was shot at using automatic rifles from a moving car in the style of the “90’s showdowns”. This is approximately how the local crime acts. In the case of Mozgovoy’s murder everything suggests that a certain spec op took place, which required serious preparatory work on determining the route of Mozgovoy’s movement, selecting the place for ambush for the determined route, the deployment of highly qualified people with subsequent covert retreat. All of the above suggests that this was not an amateur job but that it was done by professionals (either military or special service). The mission of eliminating Mozgovoy was a 100% success. In theory it can be proposed that this question was solved for money that that some unit agreed to eliminate the brigade commander, but from my point of view this is unlikely, because the risk of simply “cleaning” the participants of such schemes is very high once the information about this will reach the military counter-intelligence or at least the Ministry for State Security. So, in this respect, I view the “criminal” version as the least probable, even though it cannot be completely ruled out, because there is a possibility of the local criminals assisting the murderers.

Torez administration after the attack that was organized by the joint efforts of the SBU, Lyashko, and “Abelmas”.

Here we can also give an example of Ruslan Onishenko, a crime boss from Torez, who cooperated with the SBU even before forming the “Shakhtyorsk” punitive battalion (in Russian) and took part in murdering DPR activists. Later, under a callsign of “Abelmas” he first became the deputy commander of “Shakhtyorsk” and later he became the commander of the MIA battalion “Tornado” (where among him other crime bosses were gathered, a significant proportion of whom were wanted already during the times of Yanukovich regime).

Translation of the text shown above: We need the lists exactly for May 11! The heads and the deputies of the commisions. Tomorrow I’ll wake up, get sober, and call. Thanks in advance.

A request by the SBU contact to “Abelmas”.

Translation of the text shown above: For goodness sake, don’t show up in the coming days. You don’t know me. Farewell.

From the SMS-correspondence between “Abelmas” and his SBU contact.

Overall, speaking of this version — there was a motive, the capabilities for independent fulfillment of the threats to Mozogovoy were limited.
So, speaking of the criminal trace in Mozgovoy’s murder, it cannot be ruled out that it may not have been the main reason for the death of the brigade leader but could play some role, especially given the fact that the local organized crime works on both sides of the front line.

Arguments in the LPR

Plotnitsky, Mozgovoy, and Kozitsyn

A more popular version is that Mozgovoy’s murder was contracted by Plotnitsky or somebody else in the LPR leadership.
It is no secret that Mozgovoy had serious arguments with the republican leadership since September 2014, as a part of intense feuding inside the LPR on the subject of the LPR structure and reporting to Plotnitsky.

The principal stages of these developments.

Blue – territories under the control of the “Cossack national guard”
Grey – transitional territories
Green – territories under the control of the “LPR” group.

1. In September 2014, on the background of the continued anarchy in the LPR (with which even the vacationeer-mentors couldn’t cope with — the mission of “Elbrus” and “Dolphin” failed, the coordination HQs in Krasnodon didn’t work properly in the end), Mozgovoy tried to gather a council of the field commanders of the DPR and the LPR and to elect the supreme commander of the NAF military there. But due to the internal tensions among the commanders the planned council failed — few people responded to Mozgovoy’s invitation and the council failed.
Mozgovoy had strained relations with Kozitsyn, he fell out with Dryomov due to the arguments on the subject of abandoning the Lisichansk wedge.

The front line before the militia retreated from the Lisichansk wedge.

Formally, the Lisichansk wedge was abandoned by the decision of the DPR defense minister Strelkov, because holding on to it would trigger the loss of all forces located there and personally I view the decision of abandoning Lisichansk as a correct decision. Given the forces available to Mozgovoy and the configuration of the front at that time, he would end up in a pocket similar to the Debalcevo pocket. Even though the front line still held near Pervomaisky and Popasnaya, the eastern face of the Lisichansk wedge already started to “fold” because the LPR command didn’t have sufficient forces to engage and bind the forces that the enemy threw at cutting off the Lisichansk wedge.
Back then Mozgovoy publicly lamented the lack of anti-tank weapons and armor, which was strongly reminiscent of what happened at Yampol and Slavyansk.

Translation of the text above:
The refinery was shelled again today… a large group of armor was stopped on its approaches. A tank, an IFV, and two trucks with ammunition for “Grad” vehicles were destroyed.
For the Ukrainian army these are minor losses, which they won’t even mention. As for us, we lost more people today than ever… The fighters didn’t retreat from their FA a single step! They stood to the last, but didn’t let the tank column through. With the weapons we have… they could only perish. Only three out of ten RPGs worked!!! We don’t have anything else to oppose the tanks! Where are the columns that roll into Lugansk and Donetsk??? Where’s that artillery about which they write in the Internet so merrily??? Where are the tanks that fill the pages of the internet communities??? Where’s all that? Whose asses are protected by all that materiel???
Today I lost almost a whole platoon… the guys were simply rolled over by tanks. They didn’t even let us collect the bodies, as for the WIAs – they were finished off by the national guardsmen. After this I am myself half-dead  But I swear! If I remain alive, I’ll make everyone who promote himself on this war and build their political future sufer! I’ll make those who make money on the lives of the people who die for truth suffer!!!


However, Dryomov thought that Mozgovoy is to blame for abandoning Lisichansk. These accusations most had to do with the fact that a commandant company was left in Lisichansk, which continued to offer resistance already after the retreat (some of the personnel perished, others managed to get through to their own). The reasons for leaving this company are still quite murky — some believe that they forgot to warn them, others — that they became victims to the secrecy of the retreat and that for some reasons they were not informed of the command plans. Still others state that the company was consciously left in the rear guard (that is, it was effectively sacrificed) in order to cover the retreat of the main forces, which became inevitable after abandoning Severodonetsk.

A promised, but never happened, Bolotov’s counter-offensive became one of the last steps taken by the first LPR leader as the Republic’s head.

The promised counter-offensive by Bolotov, which was supposed to use the armor accumulated due to the “South Cauldron” and the “voentorg” shipments remained a propaganda phantom. The accumulated reserves were properly used only in August, during the decisive fighting in the area of Krasnyi Luch, Lutugino, Khryashevatoye, and Novosvetlovka, when Bolotov was already removed.

Pavel Dryomov, the commander of Platov Cossack regiment, is now holding a front line segment near Bakhmutka.

In the end, the situation when the forces were saved but people were abandoned created certain tensions between Dryomov and Mozgovoy, which impeded their cooperation, although with respect to criticizing the Minsk truce and the current LPR leadership they were in essence united.

Strelkov and Mozgovoy. Moscow, September 2014. During the summer of 2014 their forces suffered the heaviest blows of the enemy.

2. A public rapprochement with Plotnitsky and Kozitsyn (who acted completely autonomously and even promoted his subordinates to the generals of the Cossack National Guard) followed in October, when the sides under the pressure from Moscow formally agreed to cooperate. This was an awkward union, because not a single of the leaders who formed it could claim the entirety of the LPR authority for objective reasons and this temporary triumvirate became a compromise of sorts between the most influential figures in the LPR at that moment. Among all three, Mozgovoy was the weakest in the military respect. Plotnitsky received reinforcements through “voentorg” and Kozitsyn only recently got inflated by the trophies from the “South Cauldron” and the mini-cauldrons that followed routing the junta groups near Lutugino, the Lugansk airport, and Khryashevatoye.

Elections of the LPR head.

3. However, already in November, after Plotnitsky got legitimized through elections as the head of the republic and started to gradually collect power, the conflicts in the LPR flared up with new intensity. Besides Kozitsyn and Mozgovoy, a number of other commanders ended up opposing Plotnitsky – Dryomov, Bednov, Ishenko, Fominov, the former Minister of the Defense of the LPR Bugrov. Later they were even accused of conspiracy (in Russian) with the goal of deposing Plotnitsky.
The fate of this opposition varied:

1. Kozitsyn – is in Russia, a significant part of his people transferred under the command of the centralized LPR authority.
2. Dryomov – became a part of the armed forces of the republic, received a banner from Plotnitsky, although there is light criticism coming from him at times.
3. Bednov – executed by “our side”.
4. Fominov – officially arrested, his whereabouts are unknown (most likely he is sitting at the basement of the Ministry for State Security or of the Ministry of the Internal Affairs of the LPR).
5. Bugrov – arrested in Russia, officially for some financial machinations (smuggling of pipes) associated with Rottenberg’s firm.
6. Ishenko – executed, it is not exactly clear by whom.
7. Mozgovoy – executed, it is not exactly clear by whom.

Compromising material on Kozitsyn, which was spread in the face of the compromising material on Plotnitsky. Effectively, the sides argued about which of them sold more coal to the junta, while other “businessmen” sold it semi-legally or illegally.

A punishment by whipping in Antratsit.

4. Blood was shed in the end of November (in Russian). Unable to negotiate about who will control the legal and the semi-legal shipments of coal to the junta, bloody feuds started between Plotnitsky and Kozitsyn, which involved Antratsit (it became a symbol of Cossack arbitrariness of sorts), Krasnyi Luch, Krasnodon, and a number of other settlements. These feuds, which resembled a criminal hello from the 90s, killed several tens of people on both sides. This includes the leadership of Antratsit, which was locked on Kozitsyn. Meanwhile, both sides eagerly uploaded dirt on each other on the internet, which had to do with coal trading (in Russian).
A conflict with Dryomov continued in the meantime, who threatened to publicize the contents of a flash drive with dirt on Plotnitsky and impeded trading coal through subordinate territory. Meanwhile, he had been orally insulting the LPR MPs. Due to the approximate equivalence of forces, the arguments couldn’t be resolved by force and the conflict stretched until the spring of 2015.

5. Alexander Bednov is killed in early January. LPR leadership takes responsibility.

The Lutugino turn. The location of the death of Alexander Bednov and of the fighters of the “Batman” RRG (some of them were RF citizens). – the murder of Bednov. Part No. 1 – the murder of Bednov. Part No. 2 – the murder of Bednov. Part No. 3

Meanwhile, the campaign on discrediting one of the most famous field commanders of Novorossia is unfolding. The last name of the “vacationeer” Vagner is brought up during the scandal as well as various political details of feuding in Lugansk, which also made Bednov’s murder purely political, despite the attempts to present his case as being purely criminal. A clear result was the vote on the “Russian Spring”, where Bednov became one of the five (in Russian) most popular heroes of Novorossia of 2014. This murder, and the subsequent informational campaign for discrediting Bednov seriously discredited the LPR leadership. I’ll get back to this question somewhat later.

The commander of SBrSD (Separate Brigade of Special Designation) “Odessa” and the “Ghost” brigade commander Mozgovoy.

6. A number of autonomous units are subsequently disarmed, which includes SBrSD “Odessa” of Fominov (in Russian). Fominov accused Plotnitsky of selling Russian humanitarian aid through the network of “Narodny” supermarkets. He had no photos, but he had documents + video of opening one of the warehouses, which was uploaded by his people on the internet.

This was presented as “showdowns between the gangs of Plotnitsky and Fominov” by the Ukrainian media. Naturally, all of the feuds between Plotnitsky and Kozitsyn and Plotnitsky and Fominov were simply a boon for the Ukrainian propaganda. We’ll look at why this happened in more detail.

On January 10th, after disarming “Odessa” (which was used among other things for the attempts of pressuring Mozgovoy) and arresting Fominov, the weapons and humanitarian aid were evacuated from the “Odessa” base in 5 KAMAZ trucks. The subsequent fate of Fominov is quite murky. Among the accusations directed at him that I heard: expropriating the humanitarian aid and the refusal to report to joint military structures. How much truth is there in these accusations – I don’t want to judge, I didn’t see the facts. The only thing I’d note is that Fominov wasn’t murdered, even though his people put up the largest amount of compromising material on the internet. Somewhat less was uploaded by Kozitsyn’s and Dryomov’s people. Mozgovoy and Ischenko limited themselves to generic statements. Nevertheless, the much less famous Fominov wasn’t executed, but rather was captured and placed in a basement.
A substantial consequence of the hassle raised by Fominov and his people became a visit by the RF commission into Lugansk on the subject of checking the accusations about stealing humanitarian shipments from the “white convoys”. In April some even thought that there will be consequences – Plotnitsky stayed in the RF for a time and there were rumors of him being replaced due to the accumulated negative evidence (Bolotov suddenly reappeared in the media field), but later Plotnitsky returned and continued to work as the head of the republic. Whether this story will have further consequences remains unknown.

Yevgeny Ischenko with his spouse.

7. Yevgeny Ischenko was murdered on January 23rd near Pervomaisk (in Russian), who held Dryomov’s positions during the acute conflict between Dryomov and Plotnitsky and accused Plotnitsky of stealing humanitarian aid and brokering a cease-fire with the junta (in Russian). But already on January 1st of 2015 Ischenko publicly stated that he has no further issues with Plotnitsky (in Russian). Dryomov and Mozgovoy spoke in similar words. Who killed Ischenko – the junta SRG or, like in the case of Bednov, “our side” — is not known. In any case there is a clear connection between the emergence of the information about the participation of the “vacationeers” in the liquidation of Bednov and the backing down and reducing the intensity of the criticism by the famous field commanders. That is why it is hard to say why Ischenko had to be killed, if he publicly spoke of his loyalty and there are no facts of him plotting against Plotnitsky. The murder of Ischenko and the Russian volunteers who died with him simply faded on the background of the unfolding battle for the Donetsk airport and Debalcevo.

Ataman Kozitsyn, the leader of the “Cossack National Guard”, up until recently he controlled about a half of the LPR.

8. In March, after the end of the battle for Debalcevo, the active phase of the internal conflict within LPR between the cossacks and the leadership of the LPR reignited, when ataman Kozitsyn returned into Novorossia on February 18-19. The FSB held Kozitsyn at the border, because there was a “hold” placed on his entry into the territory of the Novorossia, but after some unclear convulsions in Moscow Kozitsyn got the “green light” and, unexpectedly for many, showed up in Novorossia again, even though it was thought that, like Strelkov, Bolotov, and Bezler, he won’t return again.

Ataman “Kosogor”, who controlled Krasnyi Luch.

Ataman “Magadan”, controlled Petrovskoye. Recently he was let go, joined the territorial militia.

In the end all of this led to the continuation of arrests and bloody showdowns. The famous atamans “Kosogor”, “Magadan” and so on and so forth were arrested.
Some were later released due to the lack of crimes (in Russian) and now they joined the LPR military structures, some are still imprisoned (“Kosogor” on charges of abusing local population and hostage-taking). Armor, and even whole howitzer batteries were withheld from the units that were declared to be organized crime groups. In early April there was an ultimatum for Kozitsyn – either he joins the military structures of the LPR or he goes. In the end Kozitsyn was again squeezed out of the LPR and he is now in Russia and a significant part of his former domain transferred under the control of the LPR, although there is no speaking about a final resolution to the conflict. It is just that the part of the bloody struggle for the coal money (in which, according to Dryomov, some of the supervisors were involved (in Russian) and also certain supervisors who were solving their private issues associated with personal enrichment under the banner of building the LPR) fell from the level of standoff between Plotnitsky and Kozitsyn into shadows.

The former minister of defense of the LPR Bugrov.

8. Bugrov (in Russian) was arrested in Saint-Petersburg on April 1st, who already had no significant influence over the processes in the LPR. The circumstances of his arrest are quite murky, so here we can guess whether this arrest had to do with the political struggle in the LPR or if it was just a coincidence. Little is actually known about Bugrov, he wasn’t very popular even when he was in power. During the autumn of 2014 he stood for wide entry of Kozitsyn’s cossacks into power. It is hard to say if he had common interests with Kozitsyn or not.

By the time of Mozgovoy’s murder the opposition for Plotnitsky was already quite hollow, because the most significant figures already either joined the LPR or were removed in one way or another. Due to the understanding the fact that Plotnitsky is just a high-ranking executive and that opposition to him implies a conflict with his supervisors even Dryomov tempered his pride and Kozitsyn was forced to yield. Regarding the killings, as of today we can speak with 100% confidence only about “Batman” killing, who was eliminated precisely for his political opposition (either on the behalf of the people from the LPR leadership or on the behalf of the LPR supervisors). There’s no such confidence about Ischenko. As well as, actually, about Bugrov’s arrest.

One of the samples of the oeuvre by Kurginyan’s sectarians, who continued to strike various Novorussian commanders during the whole year – Strelkov, Mozgovoy, Petrovsky, Bezler, and meanwhile promoted Khodakovsky.

Since the autumn of 2014 there was an informational campaign on discrediting Mozgovoy (in Russian), where Kurginyan’s sect was cooperating with the junta media and the “redsofa unitary-Ukrainiantards”, who formed a united front in the business of discrediting the brigade commander. Meanwhile, the official LPR authorities had a more restrained public posture towards the conflict with Mozgovoy and when the question of disbanding the brigade stood up in the winter, they refuted these rumors together with Mozgovoy, which allowed Mozgovoy to say back then that “Ghost” will be preserved through the process of “brigadization”.
In essence, the conflict ended up being frozen. Mozgovoy continued to occasionally scold the Lugansk government, but after Bednov killing he did this quite vaguely.

Mozgovoy at the front near Debalcevo.

After the start of the battle for Debalcevo, Mozgovoy’s brigade received a supply line on the level of the units of the People’s militia of the LPR and took part in the offensive on the north-eastern face of the Debalcevo wedge. The offensive developed with intermediate success and was associated with significant losses due to the mistakes by the commands and the growing pains of the LPR army. At a certain stage Mozgovoy refused to attack in order to not waste his people in useless head-on attacks. Later they tried to blame him for this, alleging that he disrupted the plans of the offensive on Debalcevo from the north-east. Actually, the head-on attacks choked not only on the location of Mozgovoy’s advance and of his flank neighbors. The offensive got stuck on the majority of the front, similarly to e.g. how the offensive at Nikishino stopped, how the offensive on Krymskoye choked, and to how our forces were repelled from Troitskoye. The accusations of the brigade avoiding active participation in the offensive the brigade reasonably answered with the fact that it was exactly the “Ghost” fighters who saved the “August” battalion fighters (the commander was removed) after heavy losses.

The front line at Debalcevo on the eve of the decisive attack by “Olkhon” and the GRU DPR to Logvinovo.

The success (in Russian) was achieved mostly due to the efforts of the DPR army (and even there not by the forces of the newly formed brigades but by the joint group made of the veterans of various units), which managed to penetrate the enemy front line near Uglegorsk and which led to the cauldron. During subsequent proceedings they tried to turn Mozgovoy into a scapegoat, but the fact of replacing “Tambov” was much more illuminating. This topic is discussed in more detail in the well-known discussion on Debalcevo. (in Russian) – How Debalcevo was captured. Part No. 1 (in Russian) – How Debalcevo was captured. Part No. 2 (in Russian) – How Debalcevo was captured. Addendum

Dryomov gets the banner from Plotnitsky.

By May, Mozgovoy kept his brigade but it became much smaller. The limitations of supply, internal conflicts, losses, and the war-weariness seriously reduced the headcount of the brigade. A part of it joined the official military structures of the LPR as a battalion of the territorial defense, similarly to a part of ataman Kozitsyn forces. Nevertheless, unlike Dryomov, Mozgovoy refused to receive the unit banner from Plotnitsky’s hands and remained in an intermediate position of sorts, when on the one side his unit was a part of the LPR military structure, and on the other side there was no full-fledged political integration in the LPR due to the political views of Mozgovoy and his attitude towards the LPR leadership. Here we are not speaking of the military questions, because it is not Plotnitsky who is in charge of the war on the LPR territory but rather the people like Tambov, who led the both the units of the People’s Militia of the LPR and the territorial units and the semi-autonomous units of Kozitsyn and Mozgovoy during the winter campaign. So, the conflict had more of a political and ideological nature rather than military one.

Already in May the conflict flared up again when Mozgovoy was forbidden to hold a military parade in Alchevsk, after which he ignored the ban and held an international conference in Alchevsk (in Russian). Precisely due to this conference the question of systemic political disagreements stood up again. Having received support from the MFA of the LPR and a number of ministries (which suggest serious internal tensions within the leadership of the LPR), Mozgovoy was opposed by certain LPR officials, who tried to disrupt the conference. On May 8th, according to Mozgovoy, certain unannounced by him people who were associated with the LPR leadership direct threatened him with his arrest and murder.

«Within half-an-hour there were two “generous” offers — the arrest and the utter elimination… In the case I won’t refuse to hold a military parade in Alchevsk and to hold the absolutely necessary as of today event for Novorossia — the forum of solidarity between the people of Novorossia and Europe»
«There is a dictatorship. But not a military and not of the proletariat. A dictatorship of choreographers from the previous times… And let the AFU representatives be jubilant, because their picture is the same. A year ago many of you sincerely believed in the disintegration of the oligarchic regime and in the return of the dignity to the people. In the end, one set of thieves was replaced by another set of thieves — more bloodthirsty, effectively the same analogy can be drawn in our territory as well. All of those who arose here — arose for justice and the supremacy of the PEOPLE! In the end both sides got the same thing — murder. A murder of their own,” — Mozgovoy laments.
«After today’s argument with certain people, there will be no victory day parade in Alchevsk – not because I pitied myself… there are many innocent people around me. And each spared life is the best reward. I offer my apologies to everyone who expected this parade» (in Russian) – link

Effectively, Mozgovoy accused the LPR leadership of presence a certain group of people (we’ll get back to this), which he distinguished from the overall leadership, who threatened his murder. I remind you that after Bednov’s murder the representative of the LPR counter-intelligence spoke in similar terms, suggesting that some unannounced group is framing Plotnitsky as the main to blame. Besides, Mozgovoy released two position articles — “The System” (in Russian) and “The System-2” (in Russian), which were an unambiguous critique of the current LPR leadership and were effectively an answer to the offers of not holding the conference.

When the murder followed (for now we won’t touch the topic of who exactly was the murderer), naturally the LPR leadership became the prime suspect, given such a background, because there were both serious disagreements and the public threats directed at Mozgovoy and also one confirmed fact of eliminating a disagreeable field commander (which certain lame propagandists interpreted as a step in the right direction, not thinking in their lameness of the consequences for the LPR). On the one side there is a clear scheme: Mozgovoy had an open conflict with Plotnitsky (or with some people who stand above Plotnitsky / pursue their goals independently from Plotnitsky) and after the sounded threats he was stupidly and talentlessly murdered, to make an example for others. Furthermore, after the murder of Bednov, many critics of the LPR leadership openly declared that Mozgovoy will be also killed.
Simplistically, this looks like the following picture, which is spread on social networks.

Translation: Here’s who is the real Hero of Ukraine!

But is everything so straightforward?

To be continued. In the second part we will look at the Ukrainian trace and at the conspiracy theory associated with the “third power” and certain questions of the “hybrid war”, after which there will be a summary.

Original article: (in Russian)

We continue to review versions of the murder of Aleksey Mozgovoy. In the first part (in Russian) the versions of the criminal trace and the LPR feuds were considered. Below we will consider the version of the Ukrainian trace and of the “third party”.

The Ukrainian trace

The SBU Spetsnaz officers on the location of the killing of the SBU officer near Slavyansk. April of 2014.

One of the main versions is considered to be the version of the involvement of the fascist junta in the elimination of the famous Novorussian commander. There are more than plenty of motives for this.

1. Mozgovoy is one of the most famous heroes of the Donbass rebellion, he is one of those who effectively cut Donbass off from Ukraine.
2. Mozgovoy pursued a quite inconvenient for the junta informational line on “turning bayonets to Kiev,” trying to deliver propaganda through text messages and video chats among the junta supporters, working towards blurring the electoral groups of the Kiev regime support.
3. The junta knew perfectly well about the systemic tensions in the LPR, when the murder of a prominent commander could be easily presented as if it was carried out on the order of Plotnitsky/LPR supervisors. Moreover, there was already an episode with “Batman”s murder, which allowed to easily ascribe such an action to the LPR.
4. The murder of a famous military leader in the deep rear (about 50 kilometers from the front line) is a perfect occasion to show the increased strength of one’s own sabotage/reconnaissance forces (or of the international units presented as such).
5. In the case of a possible offensive, introducing turmoil in the NAF ranks is a perfect tactical move, which may be associated with a number of informational and disinformation measures.
6. A complete collapse/disbandment of the “Ghost” brigade due to the loss of the moral compass.

Officers of the SBU Spetsnaz who acted on the NAF territory under cover.

What kind of capabilities there were for this.

1. The doubts of whether this was an SRG are naturally triggered due to the relatively high distance between the crime site and the front line. Typically, the SRG in this conflict were engaged much closer to the front line. The SRG operations at this depth are conducted rather rarely, only a couple of operations were mentioned. Such operations typically require rigorous preparation, high professionalism of the personnel, accurate intelligence and well-prepared means of retreating. There are possibilities when such groups are already deployed on the enemy territory and work based on the local agent and intelligence network. This is approximately how the autonomous SRG and the spotter groups worked in Donetsk and Lugansk until systemic work started against them through the Ministry for State Security and republican spec op units. In this respect the version of a Ukrainian (or foreign, by Klintsevich version, American) SRG deployed through the front line, reached the ambush site, liquidated Mozgovoy, retreated without unmasking itself and crossed the front line without any accidents appears to be a stretch. It is much more likely that such a group was either already on the LPR territory (e.g., based on the SBU cells) or it didn’t go anywhere after the ambush and murder of Mozgovoy and simply laid down. However, the version of a spec op with entry and exit cannot be ruled out, in the SBU Spetsnaz or in the army special units of the AFU there could be personnel of sufficient qualifications, plus the possibility of foreign specialists cannot be ruled out. But there is no factual evidence on this topic.

One of the junta saboteurs, killed on the LPR territory.

2. Such an operation would be impossible if the enemy didn’t know the route of Mozgovoy’s motorcade. This is a quite secret information, which the enemy couldn’t get easily. What kind of means of obtaining such information there are:

a) a traitor in Aleksey Mozgovoy’s circle, who could dump the information on the motorcade route to the other side
b) traitor/traitors in the military or special service circles of the LPR, who could also possess this information and dump it on the side (also with the goal of eliminating Mozgovoy by the junta’s hands)
c) sources in the criminal circles of Alchevsk, which could obtain the motorcade route in some way
d) radio intercept and signals intelligence data, which allowed to access the route of Mozgovoy’s movements due to the issues in the design of the security system

At this time there is no clear explanation of the source from where a Ukrainian (or foreign) SRG learned the route of Mozgovoy’s movement.
The probability is quite high that even if Mozgovoy was killed by a Ukrainian SRG that passed through the front line, there was also a traitor working from within. Such questions already emerged quite recently on the account of the story with “Spetsnaz fighters” near Schastye and the systemic campaign on discrediting the GRU GSh of the RF.

Regarding the question of taking responsibility, the junta took an ambivalent position.

1. The deputy minister of the MIA Anton Gerashenko disowned (in Russian) Mozgovoy’s murder by saying that this is the work of the GRU Spetsnaz of the RF, continuing to develop the topic of the “Russian military presence” on the Donbass territory.

2. Kolomoisky’s accomplice named Filatov commented on the situation in a similar fashion.

Translation of the text above:
To Mozgovoy’s memory
I recall the terrible spring of the last year.
I recall the terrible summer of the last year.
I remember hundreds of people that we and Ruban pulled out of captivity.
I remember our phone talks with Bes, Mozgovoy, and Dryomov.
For a single living soul we were ready to talk with tens of scumbags.
Some are gone. Others are even further gone.
Tsaryov – you are next.
The Russian world eats its bastards.

3. The leader of the semi-virtual organization “Shadows” named Anton Gladkyi (who was earlier marked by fairy-tales about the killed Russian generals (in Russian)), said, that this was done by his people and described his own version of Mozgovoy’s murder.

Two SBU projects. The formal leader of the “Right Sector” Yarosh and the formal leader of the “Shadows” unit Gladkiy.

Mozgovoy was blown up by two MON 50 at 18:48 near the settlement of Mikhaylovka at the turn of the Perevalsk–Lugansk road. He was approaching from the side of Stakhanov
3 people who accompanied Mozgovoy died during the explosion, three more were finished off with an AK (7.62).
“..The mines worked simultaneously, the left side where Mozgovoy was sitting in the rear took the main hit… he was hit by the explosion right away, but he was making noises, we gave two bursts, he stopped making noises…”
“…Toyota jeep in khaki colors, toned windows, … in the rear, it worked in the rear axle, … only three of them got out in the front and that’s where we took them down, maybe there were more corpses in the car, here they say that 7 people were subtracted together with mozgovoy, but I counted on our side, he was easy to see and in the rear there was just a mess…
There was another Chevrolet jeep accompanied them, it got delayed and didn’t emerge from the turn. We immediately withdrew, there’s a settlement nearby, and from there the cockroaches deployed, they stand there, 100 men… We retreat towards the settlement of Lotikovo and then did a circle through the settlement …” They offer a price of 300 thousand bucks for our heads. Cheap.
And 100 thousand bucks for the info.. This sum needs to be transferred to the defense fund of Ukraine. We told you, pay, Donbass is not drive empties?!))
Glory to Ukraine

Allegedly killed by “Shadows” allegedly “Russian general”.

A commentary of the RF MoD on that episode.

The organization itself is an SBU project analogous to the Nazi project “Werewolf” (in Russian) that was launched in April 1945 on the Reich territory. A significant part of actions within the confines of these projects is strictly propaganda and virtual, which cover genuine operations on the SBU line and ministerial spetsnaz squads. The official legend of the modern “Ukrainian Werewolf” looks like this: (in Russian)

Naturally, there is a question — who’s lying, Gladkiy or Gerashenko, who got caught with various lying many times already. If Gerashenko is lying (in principle, if the operation was done through the SBU or by the foreign “pros”, then he simply may not be informed), then it is quite clear that the junta is interested in the internal turmoil in the LPR and besides the murder of the famous commander one may reap the fruits of the feuds associated with Mozgovoy’s murder.
But then the behavior of the SBU project appears quite weird, which effectively impedes this and passes the responsibility for Mozgovoy’s murder to the junta. Can this be a private PR of Gladkiy, who unconsciously breaks the game of the notional Gerashenko? But how could this be private PR if Gladkiy is systemically engaged in the topic of fighting the Russian army in Donbass?

If we accept the version of Plotnitsky ordering this, then why would Gladkiy effectively take the responsibility to himself and destroy the whole game towards the internal turmoil in the LPR? This lack of agreement in the actions is somewhat strange or perhaps one of the goals of the operation was further inflating of the “Shadows” project. There is too little data here to make a definite conclusion. The command of the “Ghost” brigade already made an announcement (in Russian) that it views Mozgovoy’s murder as being committed by the junta, effectively accepting Gladkiy’s version.

The attempt (on Mozgovoy) of March 7.

3. Regarding how Mozgovoy personally viewed the hunt on him, then e.g. accusing some people in the LPR leadership of threatening to kill him, which he heard on May 8th, he didn’t blame the LPR leadership with respect to the attempt on his life on March 8th. Rather, he said (in Russian) that he won’t be pulled into the internal arguments within the LPR. With respect to accepting the responsibility, then back then, just like now, the SBU reported organizing the assassination attempt.

A reasonable question emerges here: if the “Shadows” organization is virtual, then why does it constantly take the responsibility for assassination attempts? It appears that in this way the SBU effectively covers up the republican authorities from any accusations of being associated with Mozgovoy’s murder. Or perhaps behind this Gladkiy’s PR there is work of more serious structures — the informational-sabotage war. We’ll get back to this moment later.

4. Regarding the weapons, traces from 7.62 bullets don’t allow us to reliably identify those who fired, because light firearms used by the sides of this conflicts are identical. Naturally, if there were traces or casings from special ammunition (say, modern Russian or American firearms) one could hope for identifying the side based on the weapons they used, but in this case this is quite unlikely. In principle, no ultra-modern weapon systems were required in this case. Judging from the car and the bodies that were shown, there wasn’t much armor there, some of the people didn’t wear any armor vests, so using regular PK-type machine guns and the AK assault rifles was more than sufficient for effectively eliminating the marked targets.
The overall scheme (in Russian) of shooting the cars is shown in Lifenews reconstruction. They fired at close range against effectively unarmored targets. Mozgovoy had a chance to survive only if he would wear a 6+ class armored vest (which may potentially stop 7.62 caliber bullets and if he would be lucky enough to avoid being hit in the head. The armor vests of this class were brought in Novorossia, but Mozgovoy never wore them on my memory (perhaps some may correct me on this point). In this respect there are questions that have to do with the attackers being familiar with the immediate personal security detail of Mozgovoy so that his elimination didn’t require anything more serious, like in the case of the murder of “Batman” and his people. So here we go back to the question of betrayal. (in Russian) — “Ghost is being disarmed, there’s shooting”. (in Russian) — in Steshin’s comments “Ghost is being disarmed, there’s shooting”.

5. An important argument towards the Ukrainian trace is a controlled injection of the “Ghost” brigade being disarmed and that there’s shooting. This injection occurred right after the murder and was immediately spread in numerous Novorussian publics, but it was quickly refuted by the brigade command, which said that nobody is shooting and nobody’s being disarmed. Later they established the new leadership of the brigade and there were assurances of nobody disbanding the “Ghost” and the new leadership confidently announced that the murder is the work of the junta. Overall, from the junta side this was a somewhat lame attempt to play into panic and hysterical sentiment after the murder, and it cannot be ruled out that this was prepared in advance.

Overall, if we consider the version that Mozgovoy was eliminated by a junta SRG, then we can make the following conclusions:
1. The elimination by an SRG was possible in the case of deploying high level professionals as a part of well developed spec op and engaging certain information sources within the LPR security structures or the “Ghost” brigade. The enemy clearly had private information that was necessary for effective preparation for eliminating Mozgovoy. Without this, a hypothetical raid through the front line here and back appears absurd, so with high probability one may conclude that if Mozgovoy was eliminated by the junta SRG, then it was assisted from within.
2. I doubt that Mozgovoy was eliminated by precisely the “Shadows”, considering the background of this organization. But it is quite possible that this is just a part of media cover of the SBU operation or of the foreign “specialists” who are covered by the PRast Gladkiy. A complex of measures on deploying into the positions at a certain time, shooting, and retreating was required in this case (not necessarily though the front line). Is such a scenario possible? It is quite possible. However, both on the constitution and the action of the group (at least 4 people armed with AK and PK, perhaps more) it is impossible to determine its allegiance. The questions of who was shooting remain in the area of propositions judging from the motives of the sides.
The junta and some people in the LPR had motives for eliminating Mozgovoy and had the capabilities to do this, especially in the case of a probable treason.

Third power

Besides the aforementioned versions, there is also a version of there being a backstage collusion on both sides of the front line, where certain forces in the LPR and in Moscow decided to get rid of Mozgovoy with the goal of triggering turmoil in the people’s republics so that it would be easier to dump them into the Ukraine.

It is worth highlighting a very important moment for understanding the whole story with Mozgovoy. When Bednov was cynically executed and started to justify his extrajudicial murder (some — due to stupidity, other — due to malice), the following collision emerged. An informational picture appeared when the republican authorities executed a well-known commander and this was called justified. You may easily remember those who justified this extrajudicial murder during the winter. In the end it resulted with the Ukrainian propaganda getting a free ability to ascribe any murder and death of individuals to the LPR leadership. Imagine that a mortar shrapnel would hit Dryomov’s head during the shelling of Sanzharovka? What would they say then — exactly, that Plotnitsky killed Dryomov. 100% they would say that.

The commandant of Izvarino “105-th”, who perished in battle. A “victim of Plotnitsky regime” that didn’t happen.

Furthermore, when the former commandant of Izvarino died of a shrapnel would at Chernukhino I also had to hear the “opinions” that he was killed by Plotnitsky because he supposedly knew too much about the smuggling schemes that went through Izvarino. Why kill? Well, because he killed Bednov and a bunch of propagandoms cried that this was the right thing — without due process and extrajudicially. The propagandoms didn’t bother to think about the consequences. Well, the subsequent accusations of the LPR leadership is precisely the consequence of the work of those morons who decided to solve the “Batman” situation through murder and of those propagandoms who justified this, giving a miraculous gift to the junta propaganda, effectively serving as its free accomplices. And now no matter what happens in the LPR, Plotnitsky is to blame, because propaganda said that it is the right think to kill commanders. And later they are surprised when the “officer’s daughters” cry that it was Plotnitsky who killed him. Well, of course, you assisted this yourselves. If Bednov is so easy to kill, then why Mozgovoy can’t be killed? For your “decisive fight against Makhnovism by any means”. And for these “any means” you got impaled on the hook of the enemy propaganda.

Here I don’t even mention of whether Plotnitsky is involved in any other stories besides Bednov’s murder. I only write that those who were responsible for “bringing order” to the LPR and justifying the screw-ups that happened there turned Plotnitsky into an absolutely dependent scapegoat, on whom everyone started to dump everything that happens in the republic (meanwhile, also smeared the republican leadership), although it is laughable to think that Plotnitsky can make any decision to eliminate anyone without the knowledge of those who actually run the security situation in the LPR. And the problem is not just in the Ukrainian propaganda, which simply took advantage of this free gift, but in those people who had to do with the operational policy on the LPR territory and with those to whom Plotnitsky reports. It ends up being absurd — on the one side they scream that Plotnitsky is Kremlin’s puppet, on the other side — he decides who gets eliminated even though the consequences involve Russia in one way or another.

Here we must digress. Some don’t understand why the republics who are not supported by Russia should develop in roughly the same direction and actually everything works out quite differently. The secret of these differences is that the republics are guided by different structures, which often compete against each other within the confines of pursuing supposedly common course and have different methodologies of managing the processes on the supervised territory. And in this respect I already made my opinion public a couple of times — those people who are tasked with guiding the DPR in the military and the security respect in practice ended up more literate and professional with respect to accomplishing the goals that were posed. It is sufficient to see that the principal mass of various murders, scandals, dirt, and compromising material is coming from the LPR, because those who have the duty of guiding the process solve the problems in such a way that doesn’t go anywhere. Even in the DPR one sometimes hears the phrases like “its not LPR over here”, because the original anarchy in the LPR was augmented with such “ordering” that despite all of the screw-ups of the civilian and military build-up of the DPR, the republic appears like a citadel of order on the background of the LPR. This is an indication of work of those who guided the DPR and the LPR and these indicators are substantially different. Even if you look at the roughest scenarios with elimination. A purge of Chechen highwaymen recently happened in the DPR, a part of whom simply got executed, another part was disarmed and jailed. And all of this without any significant scandal and with corresponding informational cover. I am perfectly certain that 99% of the readers never even heard of this purge, which was much more large-scale and systemic than the showdown between Plotnitsky and Kozitsyn for Antratsit.

Ataman Safonenko, the callsign of “Batya”, who was recently disarmed in Donetsk.

And take the disarmament of Saphonenko (in Russian) whose squad was much more numerous and better armed than Mozgovoy’s “Ghost” and whose “basement” was so much more roomy than Bednov’s basement. This is a quite different level of work, when the notional “fight against the makhnovism” is not turning into fucking shame and actually is systemic work. In the LPR the local morons first started incoherent wars against the cossacks, which they later covered up by absolutely lame explanations. And once “Bednov” was brought down, it got altogether very hard to repel constant accusations of “Plotnitsky murdering dissidents”.

So, speaking of malice, one can’t miss the high level of unprofessionalism and of the incompetence of those people who were placed to supervise the LPR. The DPR example shows that it was possible to work differently, but in the LPR it appears that they work like they can and not like they should. From this comes the corresponding informational background, when exclusively Plotnitsky is to blame for any death. And it couldn’t be any other way, so one shouldn’t be surprised that seeing everything that happens in the LPR people immediately reach the conclusion that if somebody was killed in the LPR then of course it was Plotnitsky again.

And now about malice. Besides the question associated with the source from which the possible junta SRG got the information about the route of Mozgovoy and his security detail, there are questions about those people who threatened to murder Mozgovoy. Unfortunately, Mozgovoy didn’t name them, so we can only guess who was this — somebody from the republican leadership, among the supervisors, or someone else. Effectively, it cannot be ruled out when those people with whom Mozgovoy was in conflict could dump certain information to the junta in order to lock the enemy SRG on target, doing dirty business by someone else’s hands.

Marat Musin suggests that there is an official who is responsible for the LPR (just like Mozgovoy, he doesn’t name the names), who is trying to act in the name of the country’s leadership for financial benefit. He is cooperating with certain officials in the security organs who have commercial interests in the LPR.

Is it true or not that during a meeting that happened several days ago in Moscow between the representatives of the leadership of the LPR and the DPR and the influential Kremlin official a thesis of united and inseparable Ukraine was sounded in order to cover up his own criminal schemes, with perhaps some federal formations in Donetsk and Lugansk? Is it true that this official is the designer of daring criminal schemes together with his Ukrainian business partners on bloody business — was sent to hell by the head of the DPR Zakharchenko, whose life is now under threat?
Is it true that certain corrupt representatives of authoritative security structures and ministries are involved in the international criminal business in Novorossia besides Ukrainian representatives? And it’s not just about hundred-and-fifty smuggled carts of coals, which are daily sent into Ukraine through Antratsit. When and who will clean this up? It was absolutely clear that Aleksey Mozgovoy would never fulfill traitorous orders and that he would never remain silent.

Zakarchenko after being wounded.

Regarding the “business partner”, perhaps this refers to Akhmetov, who met Zakharchenko in January (Akhmetov was guarded by the Dnepropetrovsk “Alpha” SBU, Zakharchenko – by “Vostok”), where the question of returning the DPR into the Ukraine was discussed. The sides couldn’t reach agreement. Zakharchenko was hospitalized in Februrary due to the punctured leg, which still didn’t fully heal.

The main “beneficiary” of Donbass, saving whose business was paid for by the blood of both sides in full.

Who is the official? The omnipresent Surkov? Or one of the immediate supervisors? Or somebody among the people on the ministerial side? It would be nice to hear the last names.

Actually, there were already several “strange” stories during this war like the “assault on the Donetsk airport on May 26,” surrender of Mariupol in May-June of 2014, the attempt to surrender Donetsk in early July of 2014, when the scalp of Rinat Akhmetov could be seen clearly through the fog of war, who tried to preserve himself on the political scene of the DPR through his connections in Moscow. As Borodai personally confessed later, Mariupol wasn’t captured in September 2014 only because this would ruin a commercial scheme that involved Akhmetov.

“– And so you may guess why we didn’t capture Mariupol in September even though there were such possibilities. Because – how can he pull his production out of the terrorist territory (according to the West), the Donetsk republic into Italy? Naturally, there’s no way he can do this. He can’t get it out of there. Correspondingly he has to ship it from the Ukrainian territory, and the only port accessible to him there is Mariupol. Not Odessa anymore. The Odessa ports are controlled by Kolomoisky, and he will never let Akhmetov get in there. So, the only possible variant where Akhmetov’s business is functioning – is when Mariupol remains under yellow-n-blue Ukrainian banner. (in Russian) – link

Actually, the very fact here is important that besides the war between of the DPR and the LPR against Ukraine and the internal feuds within the LPR there was also a massive illegal business associated with the coal shipments and the interests of the Ukrainian oligarchs, which since spring-summer 2014 tried to preserve the slipping power through their connections in Moscow and their contacts with the real supervisors of the Donbass processes, so that they wouldn’t be replaced by the “revolutional elites”. From this comes such touching care of the supervisors about Akhmetov et al’s interests, which managed to convince the operators of the process in one way or another that they will “be useful”. Naturally, people like Dryomov and Mozgovoy, who spoke of social justice were surplus on the feast of “commercial life” through which tens of millions of dollars flew. So right after Dryomov integrated into the system and “forgot” about his flash drive, Mozgovoy with his talk about the “system” and the necessity of “de-oligarchization” appeared as a certain irritant for the private business of certain people, but not more than that because the financial flows that passed through the front line did just fine without Alchevsk.

A “Ghost” fighter is putting up the USSR flag in the Debalcevo cauldron.

Was Mozgovoy a problem for the real military command in the LPR? No. He already reported to it with certain reservations (during the winter he effectively carried out “Tambov”s orders), and a part of the brigade has already been included in the local security units. The continuation of the slow-moving process of integrating the brigade into the LPR armed forces could take a few more months, but Mozgovoy had no more real alternatives – either the brigade would completely integrate into the armed forces or it would simply cease to exist. From the informational point of view Mozgovoy’s influence decreased over the last six months and his voice was no longer as loud as it was in summer-autumn of 2014. He posed no real political threat and he had no claims to the positions of the leader of the leader of the republic or of the minister of defense. The maximum position he was proposed during the negotiations is the position of a brigade commander in the LPR army.

What he could actually do is to berate the Minsk agreements and to block criminal schemes (both local and transnational), which passed through Alchevsk. If we consider a version of Mozgovoy crossing the road for the people who turned Novorossia into a business by covering with “Czar’s will” and his willfulness actually impeded them in something, then of course it cannot be ruled out that a private treason associated with dumping the information about the route of Mozgovoy’s motorcade to the junta wasn’t a part of a more global plan.

It is interesting what are these “data” and who made it available.

This plan may not just involve the murder of a disloyal brigade commander. It cannot be ruled out that there is a political dimension in this murder. On the background of the informational campaign on squeezing the Russian military out of Novorossia, which aren’t there officially (in which the junta media and the Russian fifth column cooperate touchingly), the stories directed at discrediting the Russian participating in the support of the LPR started to appear suspiciously often. First a loud scandal with the “Spetsnaz” troops (who were given inaccurate information about the junta retreating from Schastye – who gave them this information?) and then Mozgovoy’s murder, where the main guilty part is “obvious” through the efforts of the local morons.

Here is a characteristic example when the propaganda of the “struggle against Makhovism by the martial law” leads to results that quite differ from those imagined by the propagandists. Although perhaps they want precisely these kinds of results.

Personally, I don’t believe that the RF authorities decided to eliminate Mozgovoy, especially after the letters sent to the higher officials of the RF, writing that the LPR business isn’t operating properly. And Putin decided to kill Mozgovoy for this, yep. This is clear BS. Not only Mozgovoy, but other people speak on this topic, e.g., the very same Strelkov, in much more stringent terms? Why isn’t he dead yet? Why is Kozitsyn alive, who laid into the LPR leadership much more strongly? Why isn’t Fominov killed?
It is more likely that such thoughts may appear among those who had conflicts with Mozgovoy and on whom he complained to Moscow.

Could Mozgovoy have been removed for his protesting against the public statements that Donbass is Ukraine? And was he the only one who said that? The very same Zakharchenko made similar statements over the recent months — sometimes he is for talks, at other times “we’ll never return”. Why is he still in charge? If this is what Mozgovoy was killed for, then Zakharchenko also should’ve been removed.

I don’t rule out the possibility that there may have been cooperating with the enemy at one of the levels of managing the processes in the LPR, when sensitive information that led to the death of the brigade commander (who ignored the threats and conducted the conferences and complained to Moscow with respect to the “local boyars of whom the Czar is ignorant”) leaked to the other side, as well as the failure in the work of the LPR security structures, which could’ve permitted such a leak and failed to uncover the preparation of the spec op on liquidating Mozgovoy.


Could Mozgovoy be killed by our side, like Bednov? In theory, he could, moreover, Mozgovoy had enemies, but overall I am more inclined towards Mozgovoy having been eliminated by a Ukrainian (or foreign) special group, which was covered by the semi-virtual clowns from Gladkov’s “Shadows”, with a possible assist by the traitor/traitors in the LPR (or this is an absolutely appalling failure of the local special services), which disclosed the information about Mozgovoy’s movements to the enemy.

The rushed and self-contradictory activity of the Russian media, which permit chaotic mistakes (akin to the statements by the “Zvezda” TV channel that Bednov was killed by the junta — this is precisely about the lack of any coherent informational plan on the framing of Mozgovoy’s murder in the Russian media — the junta had a quite determined stance here, by playing the card “Plotnitsky killed Mozgovoy” which implies that “Putin killed Mozgovoy”), is more of a suggestion that this murder became unexpected for the official Russian line and that the informational line was created in a rush, from which come the screw-ups. Because if the goal was to eliminate Mozgovoy and if it was implemented as a part of the state policy, then the informational injections would be prepared in advance (for instance, in an hour after the murder a “convenient” version would emerge and it would be brought up on all channels since yesterday evening) and to make it even clearer they would drop off some corpse in the Ukrainian uniform, which is not hard at all. Actually, it is precisely the disorganized reaction of the Russian official sources to the events that is a perfect indication of whether Mozgovoy’s murder was planned by the Russian side. The first reaction — shock, and then the natural tendency to write “this is not us”.
You may remember, for example, how the Russian media worked when our “pros” eliminated Yandarbiyev – the reaction was “yeah, we did it; so what?”. Not only on the media level, but also on the MFA level. This goes to the question of how the informational line is prepared for the case of operations for liquidating enemies or inconvenient persons.

Mozgovoy had enemies (and he openly spoke of being threatened by murder from “own side”) on both the Ukrainian and our side, so the possibility cannot be ruled out of somebody thinking that it is possible to solve the question of the “inconvenient man” by the enemy hands and all consequences can be ascribed to the already-smeared Plotnitsky (perhaps, even consciously — who would think of mister X being involved if there is already Plotnitsky who is guilty of everything), who will be replaced by just as dependent person and so the whole thing is over. Meanwhile, those who are actually responsible for the LPR situation will end up unpunished, departing with their millions to their resting places with the words of “we tried, but that’s how it worked out”. Well, as for how this will hit the Russian interests in Donbass, who and when among the political businessmen bothered about such nuisance.

In this respect, the internal feuding in the LPR, which grew into killings of commanders justified by the propagandists, created fertile ground for various false flags, which undermine the Russian participation in the support of the LPR and which discredit not only Plotnitsky, but the republic itself, which attained the reputation of “semi-bandit enclave”, where all problems are solved like it is the 90s and if you dare to criticize it, then you are an enemy and the fifth column, because the comrades are on the right road in justifying everyone and everything, even that which can’t be justified. So, even before Mozgovoy’s murder, through the efforts of both the junta propaganda and also of the moronic supervisors the appropriate atmosphere was created which was beneficial for discrediting the Russian policy in the LPR. And, of course, for the SBU and its supervisors there couldn’t be more appropriate situation for preparing various provocative operations on the background of indirect contacts through the front line with those people who prefer the benefit of their pockets to the interests of Russia and Ukraine. And in this atmosphere of mistrust and accusations of betrayal and treason — “LPR is being dumped!”, one of Novorossia’s heroes is killed. We don’t know for sure who pulled the trigger yet and we can only suppose, but we know very well how the atmosphere in which he was murdered was created and how it was used against the LPR and Russia under the accompaniment of talk of “don’t blame the truce” and “lets kill commanders so that there would be more order”. What kind of order you’ll get in the end you can see perfectly well in the information picture that emerged after Mozgovoy was murdered.
From the point of view of the SBU now it is quite appropriate to start the hunt on Dryomov, because if he dies, even despite fully integrating into the LPR leadership and destroying the flash drive with the compromising material (on Plotnitsky), then he will still be declared to be the victim of Plotnitsky, And, of course, of Putin. And why do you care, another “Makhnovets” has died. They are to blame for everything, only them.

Original article: (in Russian)

The Essential Saker II: Civilizational Choices and Geopolitics / The Russian challenge to the hegemony of the AngloZionist Empire
The Essential Saker: from the trenches of the emerging multipolar world